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or innocence. Stevenson v. Boles, supra; State v. Goyet, 119 Vt.
167, 132 A.2d 623 (1957).
The conclusion that such confession should not be admitted as
evidence seems hard to escape when considered in light of the fact
that such an accused has been denied advice of counsel and the
right to be properly charged. When both of these abuses combine
to produce incriminating statements, voluntary or involuntary, the
subsequent use of such evidence should be prohibited. Such a conclusion was recognized even before Escobedo v. Illinois, supra,
when the Chief Justice and three other members of the Court
dissented to a conviction based on a voluntary confession elicited
from a "suspect" who had been denied the assistance of counsel.
Crooker v. California,357 U.S. 433 (1958).
The fact that the United States Supreme Court has had to deal
with this issue so frequently makes a new ruling in this area almost
inevitable. It seems that the federal courts have been trying to
allow the states to solve this problem for themselves without making
a sweeping policy ruling. The ideal way for the states to do this
would be to find more unlawfully obtained confessions involuntary
because of the psycological pressures which are surely being exerted
on a suspect when he is held for days without counsel, arraignment,
or proper treatment. The tendency now is in a direction which
may even go farther than the comparable Escobedo v. Illinois,
supra; the ultimate effect of this may well produce the elimination
of any interrogation whatsoever before counsel is provided and
proper arraignment given.
Dennis Raymond Lewis

Divorce-Merger of Separation Agreement into
Divorce Decree
D grossly misrepresented the value of his assets to induce P
to accept a relatively small lump sum payment as a property
settlement and for her waiver of future support payments. P subsequently obtained a divorce and the separation agreement was
incorporated into the decree. There was no judicial inquiry as to
the fairness or adequacy of the agreement. P later learned of the
husband's fraud, brought an action of deceit and recovered judg-
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ment. Held, affirmed. Under Kansas law, incorporation of a separation agreement into a divorce decree does not merge the contract
into the decree so as to preclude a future action on the contract,
unless the decree contains clear and unequivocal language requiring that conclusion. Furthermore, this was not an action on the
contract itself, but was in tort to recover damages flowing from
D's fraud. One judge dissented, reasoning that under the particular
fact situation, the contract had merged into the decree, and that
relief from D's fraud should be left to the court in which it had
been practiced. Hood v. Hood, 335 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1964).
The principal case illustrates the problem which confronts the
courts after entry of a final divorce decree which makes reference to or incorporates a separation agreement. The question of
whether the agreement is merged in the decree so that it loses its
identity as a contract is important. If a merger results, a suit
can no longer be brought on the contract, and the rights and duties
of the parties are regulated solely by the terms of the decree.
Simpson v. Superior Court, 87 Ariz. 350, 351 P.2d 179 (1960).
The question of whether the contract terms are a part of the decree,
enforceable by contempt proceedings, is likewise important. If a
merger does not occur, it is possible to resort to either the agreement
or the decree, and sometimes to both. Hettich v. Hettich, 304 N.Y.
8, 105 N.E.2d 601 (1952); Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N.Y. 296, 26
N.E.2d 265 (1940). However, where a party has concurrent remedies under a property settlement and a divorce decree, payments
made under one must be credited to the amount due under the
other. Roberts v. Roberts, 83 Cal. App. 345, 256 Pac. 826 (1927).
Whether a merger occurs affects not only the remedies available
in case of default, but also the legal status of the agreement in the
event of a subsequent attack. If the agreement does merge into the
decree, and the decree is valid, the decree is not open to collateral
attack. Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 82 S.E.2d 553 (1954). The
decree is res judicata, and a party cannot avoid his obligations
under the contract by claiming it was an illegal contract when made,
or that it is voidable because procured through fraud. Howard v.
Howard, 27 Cal. 2d 319, 163 P.2d 439 (1945). Such a decree is
entitled to full faith and credit in every other state, and may be
pleaded in bar in an action on the contract in any state court. Wallihan v. Hughes, supra.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol67/iss3/11

2

19651

Barnett: Divorce--Merger of Seperation Agreement into Divorce Decree
CASE COMMENTS

Another effect of merger concerns the power of the court to
modify the support provisions of a separation agreement at a later
date, or, what is more technically correct, the court's power to
modify the decree which incorporates the agreement. If a merger
was affected by the incorporation, the power of the court to
modify the support arrangement will be governed by the general
divorce laws of that jurisdiction. If merger did not occur, the
court might still modify the alimony provisions of the decree,
in those states which retain continuing jurisdiction over the
support arrangements in divorce actions. Kosch v. Kosch, 113 So.
2d 547 (Fla. 1959).
The courts are not in agreement as to how and when a merger
is accomplished. It seems universally accepted that where the
agreement is not presented to the court, it survives the decree.
Hayes v. Hayes, 15 S.E.2d 626 (Ga. 1941). However, if the court
has continuing divorce jurisdiction, the parties cannot by contract
bargain away their right to seek a change in alimony at a later
date. Deitch v. Deitch, 149 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1955). A contract also survives when it is presented to the court and is not
incorporated into the decree. Hagen v. Hagen, 139 Ore. 369, 238
P.2d 747 (1951). In those cases where the agreement has no
specific provisions against merger, the courts are split. The majority
hold that the agreement survives. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 225 N.C.
681, 36 S.E.2d 233 (1945).
One of the problems arising when the courts incorporate a
separation agreement in a divorce decree is determining whether
the court's jurisdiction extends to the subject matter of the agreement. Ordinarily, in the absence of statutory authority, courts do
not have the power in a divorce action to divide the property
of the spouses. State ex rel. Hammond v. Worrell, 144 W. Va.
83, 106 S.E.2d 521 (1958). Many times, though, it is difficult
to determine whether the agreement which is incorporated in the
decree is a mere settlement of property rights, or a provision for
the future support of the divorcing party. The problem is further
complicated by the fact that some agreements which are intended
solely as property settlements provide for distribution to be made
by periodic cash payments over an extended period of time, thus
giving them the appearance of alimony payments. In other cases,
a decree represents a combination of a property settlement and a
support arrangement. Since courts do not generally have jurisdic-
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tion to decree property settlements, but do have authority to decree
support payments, it frequently becomes important to distinguish
between the two. In those states which retain continuing jurisdiction after entry of the final divorce decree for purposes of altering
the alimony payments, the courts can alter only the support
provisions of the decree, but have no authority to alter the property
settlement provisions. Briggs v. Briggs, 178 Ore. 193, 165 P.2d
772 (1946).
West Virginia's position in respect to property settlements and
support arrangements in divorce decrees is not clear. The Code
now provides that the court may, upon decreeing a divorce, enter
a decree concerning the maintenance of the divorcing party, and
may from time to time thereafter revise or alter such decree.
The court is also given authority to decree concerning the estate
of the parties, to the extent necessary to effectuate the maintenance decree. W. VA. CODE ch. 48, art. 2, § 15 (Michie 1961).
In State ex rel. Hammond v. Worrell, supra, the court stated that
this section did not give a divorce court authority to partition the
jointly owned lands of the parties, even with their consent, and
that part of the decree which purported to do so was void, because
the attempted partitioning was not for the purpose of effectuating
a maintenance decree. It is questionable whether this case would
be followed today, since subsequent to its decision, the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated. Rule 18 (a) of
the West Virginia Rules now permits the parties to join as many
claims as the trial court can conveniently hear in one action. It
has been held under Rule 18 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the language of which is identical with that in West Virginia's Rule 18 (a), that an action for adjudication of property
rights could be joined with an action for divorce. Holcomb v.
Holcomb, 209 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
State ex rel Hammond v. Worrell, supra, is apparently contra to
an earlier case, State ex rel. Cooper v. Garvin, 139 W. Va. 845,
82 S.E.2d 612 (1954). In the Cooper case, the court said that
W. VA. CoDE, ch. 48, art. 2, § 15 (Michie 1961), supra, gave the
trial court authority to divide the jointly owned property of the
parties. In the Cooper case, the husband obtained the divorce, and
it is clear from the decision that the court was speaking only of a
settlement of the property rights of the parties, and not a provision
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for maintenance. The court seemed to overlook, in the Cooper case,
a series of prior cases which held that the section cited did not give
the trial court authority to make any decree concerning the estate
of the parties, except to the extent necessary to effectuate the provisions of that section concerning maintenance. E.g., Wood v.
Wood, 126 W. Va. 189, 28 S.E.2d 423 (1943).
In the Cooper case, supra, the court cited W. VA. CODE ch. 48,
art. 2, § 15 (Michie 1961), and overlooked section nineteen of the
same article, which would seem to give the appropriate authorization for an adjudication of pure property rights. W. VA. CoDE ch.
48, art. 2, § 19 (Michie 1961) gives the court authority to award
to either of the parties whatever of his property is in the name
of, or under the control of, the other party. The court is given
power to compel a transfer or other conveyance thereof as in other
equity cases. In State ex rel. Hammond, supra, the court cited
section nineteen, but then proceeded to explain why section fifteen
did not give authority to partition lands in a divorce action. It
is true that in Wood v. Wood, supra, the court stated that W. VA.
CODE ch. 48, art. 2, § 19 (Michie 1961), contemplated a restoration
in kind to the party entitled thereto, and not a money recovery
for its value. Such an interpretation would seem to unduly restrict
the statute's operation, and would frustrate what could otherwise
be a legitimate and desirable purpose, i.e., to provide for the convenient and final adjudication of all property rights of the
parties at the time of the final divorce decree. To restrict its
operation to restoration of property in kind would forbid its use in
those frequent cases where both spouses have contributed to the
purchase of property, and the property is not susceptible of physical
division or partition. Since the statute gives the divorce court
authority to compel a transfer or conveyance as in other cases of
chancery, it is arguable that this should include partitioning,
either physically, by sale, or by allottment and monetary compensation. It should be noted, however, that the statute was not
intended to give to either party the property which rightfully
belongs to the other. Any decree issued under color of W. VA.
CODE ch. 48, art. 2, § 19 (Michie 1961), which would attempt to
approve by incorporation an agreement in which one of the parties
was giving the other party more than his rightful share, would be
void to that extent. Selvy v. Selvy, 115 W. Va. 338, 177 S.E. 437
(1934).
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In the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, it is well
settled that a divorce decree, rendered on personal service or
its equivalent, which is silent as to alimony, is res judicata as to
that issue, and neither party can subsequently petition for alimony.
This is generally held to be true even in those states with statutes
similar to West Virginia's, which gives the courts authority to
alter or revise a previous alimony decree. The theory is that if
there is no alimony decree, there is nothing to alter or revise, and
the statute cannot operate. Perry v. Perry, 202 Va. 849, 120 S.E.2d
385 (1961). Even if there is at the time of the decree an agreement
between the parties providing for the maintenance of the divorcing
party, such an agreement will not be sufficient to give the court
with statutes similar to West Virginia's. This is true even if the
court was fully aware of the agreement, and the agreement was
itself the reason the court made no mention of alimony in the
decree. Johnson v. Johnson, 65 How. Pr. 517, 12 Daly 232 (N.Y.
1883).
Suppose a West Virginia court incorporates into a divorce decree
a separation agreement which provides for a lump sum payment
as a provision for the divorcing spouse's future maintenance, and
expressly provides that the spouse waives any future rights to more
money. Is that part of the decree valid? The West Virginia cases
are not entirely clear on whether a lump sum payment can be made
as a provision for future support. Ordinarily, alimony should be in
periodical payments of reasonable sums, out of the husband's
income. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 68 W. Va. 15, 69 S.E. 381 (1910).
If the court lacks authority to award alimony in gross, then it
necessarily follows that any decree incorporating an agreement between the parties, providing for a lump sum alimony payment, is
void to that extent, and the only remedy available in the event
of default would be a legal action on the contract itself. In the
Reynolds case, the trial court had awarded the husband's realty to
the wife for her future maintenance. The statute then in effect
was much broader than the present statute, and gave the court
authority upon decreeing a divorce, to make such further order
as it deemed expedient concerning the estate of the parties. Even
so, the supreme court of appeals reversed, stating that generally,
in the absence of special circumstances, it is error to award permanent alimony out of the estate of the husband. The court did not
enumerate the special circumstances in which a lump sum could
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be awarded. In Tuning v. Tuning, 90 W. Va. 457, 111 S.E. 139
(1922), the court recognized one of those "special circumstances."
In that case, the wife had worked hard for years, and her efforts
had helped pay for the farm and had helped support the family.
The court stated that under those circumstances the trial court
was justified in awarding a gross sum in lieu of alimony, payable
in installments, and secured by a lien upon the husband's real estate.
The court relied heavily upon the factual situation to find a "special
circumstance," but failed to lay down any specific criteria for
determining when a "special circumstance" exists. It would therefore seem difficult to ever be completely certain that a West Virginia divorce decree, providing for a lump sum maintenance payment, would be valid insofar as the maintenance payment was
concerned.
It is obvious that the inter-relationship between post-nupital
separation agreements and divorce decrees is often rather complicated, and can lead the unwary into unexpected results. It is
thus incumbent upon the attorney and the court to proceed with
extreme caution when approaching these situations, in order to
insure that the decree and agreement are both given the effect desired to the full extent permitted by law.
CharlesEdward Barnett

Federal Courts-Diversity Jurisdiction of Proceeding
Brought by a Nonresident Guardian for a
Nonresident Incompetent Minor
This action against Tennessee residents by a nonresident for a
nonresident ward was brought in a federal court sitting in Tennessee. P, adult citizen of Florida, brought suit as guardian of her
mentally incompetent child against Ds contending that under a consent order, entered following a will contest, Ds were responsible for
the support of their sister, the ward. The action was dismissed in
the United States district court for lack of diversity jurisdiction.
Held, reversed. The district court must look to the law of the
state in which the federal court was sitting to determine the competence of the guardian to bring suit in federal court, but the
Tennessee statute requiring appointment of a resident guardian as
co-plaintiff is inapplicable to a nonresident guardian suing for a
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